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COMMENTS
Tribal Sovereignty and the Supreme Court's
1977-1978 Term
Indian tribes occupy a unique status as governmental units
within the federal system. Although most tribes exercise at least
some governmental powers,' the source of these powers raises an
interesting doctrinal question: Do Indian tribes exercise inherent
powers of a sovereign or only congressionally delegated powers?
Courts2 and commentators3 generally agree that tribes exercise
powers of limited sovereignty.' Nevertheless, notions of inherent
sovereignty have not bound the courts to decide cases in accordance with the theoretical underpinnings of this abstract doctrine.
The judicial role in the developing doctrine of tribal sovereignty
has been a dynamic one. And, although the concept of tribal
sovereignty is generally recognized, certain judicial modifications
of the doctrine arguably imply that Indian tribes do not possess
1. This Comment will deal only with those federally recognized Indian tribes that
possess a t least some powers of self-government.
2. E . g , United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Ortiz-Barraza v. United
States, 612 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975). Rut cf. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
376,379 (1886): "Indians are within the geographical limits of the United States. The soil
and the people within these limits are under the political control of the Government of
the United States, or of the States of the Union. There exists within the broad domain of
sovereignty but these two."
3. E.g., F. COHEN,FELIXS. COHEN'SHANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL
INDIANLAW122 (1971);
Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 955, 955-56 (1972). Contra, AMERICAN
INDUNPOLICY
REVIEW
COMMISSION,
FINAL
REPORT573-82 (1977) (separate dissenting views of Congressman Lloyd Meeds)
REVIEWCOMMISSION];
Martone, American Indian Tribal Self[hereinafter cited as POLICY
(hvernment in the Federal System: Inherent Right or Congressional License?, 51 NOTRE
DAMELAW.600 (1976).
4. Probably the foremost Indian law commentator, the late Felix Cohen, gave the
following definition of the extent of tribal governing power:
(1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject t o the legislative power of the
United States and, in substance, terminates the external powers of sovereignty
of the tribe, e.g., its powers to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does
not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local
self-government. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and
by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified, full
powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly
constituted organs of government.
F. COHEN,supra note 3, a t 123 (footnotes omitted).
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the inherent rights of sovereignty, but are limited to the exercise
of delegated powers.
A universally recognized tenet of Indian law is that the federal government has "plenary" power over the Indian tribes?
Thus follows a basic limitation upon inherent tribal sovereignty:
tribal powers can be limited by congressional act.6Because of this
broad limitation, one might reasonably question the meaningfulness of the distinction betjeen inherent tribal power and congressionally delegated power. Surely an inherent power that can be
severely limited is no great power.
Congress, however, apparently is not inclined to impose any
major limiting legislation upon the Indian tribes. Indeed, the
congressional disposition appears to be clearly to the contrary.
Current federal policy encourages tribes to determine their own
futures within the scope of limited federal supervision. Given this
legislative policy, judicial delineations of tribal sovereignty play
a major role in determining the scope of tribal governmental
power.
Tribal sovereignty is evidenced by any affirmative exercise
of tribal power. In addition, tribal sovereignty has defensive characteristics that come into play when another sovereign attempts
to encroach upon a function of the tribal government.' The major
source of tribal sovereignty doctrine, both historical and modern,
comes from cases involving this "defensive" aspect. Recently,
however, cases involving affirmative exercises of power have
gained some prominence as tribes have attempted to exercise
governmental powers in new areas.
Three cases from the Supreme Court's 1977-1978Term illustrate the application of the tribal sovereignty doctrine in novel
factual settings. The first case presents the question of whether
a tribe can exercise criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian? The
5. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974). "The source of federal authority
over Indian matters has been the subject of some confusion, but it is now generally
recognized that the power derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with
Indian tribes and for treaty making." McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973).
6. Governmental powers of Indian tribes are also limited by treaty provisions. However, the United States has not entered a treaty with the Indians since 1871, when Congress passed a law prohibiting future pacts. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat.
566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 5 71 (1976)).
7. This principle is of early origin. "Jean Bodin perceived in his Six livres de la
rkpublique, published in 1577, that sovereignty has a double aspect: it means that the
state, or the prince, is the supreme power over subjects in a particular territory; second,
it also signifies that the state enjoys freedom from interference by other states." I. DELUPIS,
INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT
STATE
3 (1974).
8. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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second case examines whether a tribe is an arm of the federal
government for purposes of the double jeopardy clause.' The third
case interprets the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) to determine
if it implies both a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity and a
federal cause of action against a tribal officer.1°
This Comment will first examine the historical foundation
and modern development of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty. A
brief analysis of current federal Indian policy will then be undertaken to show the legislative context in which the sovereignty
decisions must be understood. This will be followed by a close
examination of the tribal sovereignty aspects of the 1977-1978
cases. Finally, conclusions will be drawn concerning the tribal
sovereignty doctrine, its current vitality, and its applicability in
varying factual contexts.

A. Laying the Groundwork
Like many federal law principles, the judicial doctrine of
tribal sovereignty owes its birth to Chief Justice John Marshall.
His opinions in Cherokee Nation u. Georgialt and Worcester v.
Georgiat2are important for more than historical perspective;
many modern decisions continue to cite one or both of the opinions for basic Indian law proposition^.^^
In 1827, the Cherokee Nation asserted its powers of sovereignty through the adoption of a constitution.14In response, the
State of Georgia attempted to make its laws generally applicable
to the territory occupied by the Cherokees. The tribe brought an
original bill in the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin Georgia from
enforcing its laws on the Cherokee-occupied land. Although ultimately finding the Court lacked original jurisdiction because the
Cherokees did not constitute a "foreign nation," Justice Marshall
did take advantage of the opportunity to explain some basic characteristics of the nature of tribal existence within the federal
scheme:l5
9. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
10. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)..
11. 30 U S . (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
12. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
13. E.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,555 (1974); McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168-69 (1973); Stevens v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 741, 744
(9th Cir. 1971); Yanito v. Barber, 348 F. Supp. 587, 590 (D. Utah 1972).
14. See Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN.
L. REV.500, 503 (1969).
15. Compare Marshall's use of a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction as a stage to pro-
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Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they
occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary
cession to our government; yet it may well be doubted whether
those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries
of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated
foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to
which we assert a title independent of their will, which must
take effect in point of possession when their right of possession
ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation
to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.'"

The substantive controversy between Georgia and the Cherokee Nation had to wait but one more year to be heard. Samuel
Worcester, a non-Indian missionary, was indicted for the crime
under Georgia law of " 'residing within the limits of the Cherokee
nation without a license.' "I7 Worcester was found guilty in the
Georgia courts and he appealed his conviction to the United
States Supreme Court. Justice Marshall, after a lengthy analysis
of the applicable treaties, held that the United States through
federal statutes and treaties had sought to exclusively regulate
intercourse with the Indians. This, in effect, barred any state
attempt to govern the Indian territory. "The act of the state of
Georgia . . . [was] consequently void, and the judgment a nullity."'"
Marshall made a number of statements in his majority opinion from which the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty would
eventually be forged. In describing the Europeans' reaction to and
treatment of the Indians as they came to the New World, for
example, he said, "The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining
their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the
soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that
imposed by irresistible power . . . ."19 According to Marshall, the
principles of international law mandated that this independent
status should remain, at least in part: "[Tlhe settled doctrine
of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender
its independence-its right to self-government, by associating
pound doctrinal principles in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (Supreme
Court has the power of judicial review of congressional legislation).
16. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
17. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 537 (quoting the Georgia indictment).
18. Id. at 561.
19. Id. at 559.
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with a stronger, and taking its prote~tion."~~
Thus, Marshall drew conclusions regarding the status of Indian nations from the tenets of international law. Although the
rules of international law that influenced Marshall's findings are
not deemed important in modern decisions, his conclusions are.
Subsequent courts have struggled to apply these conclusions to
the difficult problems involved in tribal attempts to exercise governmental powers and state and federal attempts to encroach
upon those powers.
I

B. The Modern Development-State Encroachment
Modern interpretations of the scope of tribal governmental
power have evolved in the context of state attempts to assert
powers of government over tribes and individual Indians. The
starting point is the case of Williams v. Lee," decided by the
Supreme Court in 1959. The case involved an attempt by a nonIndian (Lee) who operated a store on the Navajo reservation in
Arizona to bring a collection suit against a Navajo couple in the
Arizona courts. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed a trial court
judgment for Lee, holding that since Congress had not expressly
proscribed such state court jurisdiction over Indians, the exercise
of jurisdiction was proper.22
Upon certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the
Arizona judgment was reversed. Justice Black, speaking for a
unanimous Court, relied on Worcester for the principle that state
assertions of jurisdiction over persons on Indian reservations are
generally invalid in the absence of congressional approval? However, the Court recognized that some intrusiohs by states had
been allowed.24Reconciling this with the general rule of no state
jurisdiction, the Court concluded: "Essentially, absent governing
Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their
20. Id. a t 560-61.
21. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). The fact that more than 100 years (1832-1959) are skipped
in this analysis should not be taken to imply that no important decisions were handed
down during this time. However, none of the cases decided in this period possess the
broad, fundamental significance of the Cherokee cases of the early 1830's. Decisions from
this period that may have particular relevance in any further discussion will be noted
therein.
22. Williams v. Lee, 83 Ariz. 241,244-46,319P.2d 998,1001-02 (1958), reu'd, 358 US.
217 (1959).
23. 358 U.S. a t 218-19.
24. State courts have been allowed to hear cases brought by an Indian against an
outsider and to assert jurisdiction over crimes committed on the reservation by one nonIndian against another. Id. at 219-20.
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own laws and be ruled by them."" This conclusion has since been
referred to as the "infringement test." Because the Court determined the Arizona court's assertion of jurisdiction infringed upon
the tribal right of self-government, the decision of the Arizona
Supreme Court was reversed."
Interestingly, the word "sovereignty" does not appear in the
Court's opinion. Nevertheless, the concept of inherent governmental power underlies the basic rationale of the decision. It was
the defensive aspect of sovereignty, i.e., the right to be free from
outside intrusion, that was involved in Williams. The rights of
sovereignty recognized by the Court were not delegated to the
tribe by Congress. Rather, they were the inherent governmental
powers of the Navajo Tribe which had neither been extinguished
nor relinquished.
The Court's reliance on tribal sovereignty is evidenced by its
failure to rely on the treaty entered into between the Navajo
Tribe and the United States. The Court noted that "[i]mplicit
in [the] treaty terms, as it was in the treaties with the Cherokees
involved in Worcester u. Georgia, was the understanding that the
internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively within the
jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existed."" In
Worcester, the Court had relied on a treaty guarantee of tribal
self-government to invalidate an attempted state encroachment.28In Williams, however, the Court reasoned that the treaty
recognized the power of tribal self-government and this preexisting power, not the treaty itself, thwarted the attempted state
encroachment.
Three years after Williams, the Supreme Court issued an
opinion interpreting the infringement test laid out in Williams.
In Organized Village of Kake u. Egan,a the power of the State of
Alaska to impose its fishing regulations on the Kakes and the
Angoons, two Alaskan nonreservation Indian groups organized
under the Indian Reorganization Act, was tested. The majority
opinion, authored by Justice Frankfurter, liberally interpreted
the infringement test so as to allow more state interference with
tribal affairs than Justice Black probably had intended in his
Williams opinion? Given the nonreservation status of the Kakes
and the Angoons, the Court's reliance on the infringement ratio-

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

- --

--

--

-

-

--

--

Id. at 220.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 221-22.
See Martone, supra note 3, at 621.
369 US. 60 (1962).
See id. at 72-76.
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nale was probably mi~guided.~'
Another important case of the 1960's was Warren Trading
Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission.32 Warren Trading Post involved an attempt by Arizona to impose its income tax on a
trading post licensed by the federal government to do business on
the Navajo Reservation.= The Arizona state courts upheld the tax
and the Supreme Court reversed. The Court, however, did not
rely upon an application of the infringement test to invalidate the
tax. Rather, it was struck down because "the assessment and
collection of this tax would to a substantial extent frustrate the
evident congressional purpose of ensuring that no burden shall be
imposed upon Indian traders . . . except as authorized by Acts
of Congress or by valid regulations promulgated under those
Acts."34Thus, the Court apparently relied on preemption principles to protect the tribe from state encroachment, much as it did
in W o r ~ e s t e r . ~ ~
The infringement and the preemption rationales were synthesized in the 1973decision of McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
C o m m i ~ s i o nArizona
.~~
had attempted to impose its income tax
on a Navajo woman living on the reservation and earning all of
her income on the reservation. The Arizona courts upheld the tax.
However, as in Williams and Warren Trading Post, the United
States Supreme Court again reversed the Arizona courts.
In a unanimous decision, Justice Marshall explained the
proper test:
[Tlhe trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on
federal pre-emption. The modem cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look in-

-

- -

31. The Court in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U S . 164 (1973),
distinguished Kake by limiting its application to nonreservation Indians. Id. at 176 n.15.
McClanahan's companion case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 US. 145 (1973),
demonstrates that even reservation Indians lose a good deal of their sovereignty-based
protections when they venture outside of their boundaries. "Absent express federal law
to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held
subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State."
Id. at 148-49. In Mescalero, the Court upheld a New Mexico gross receipts tax on the
Mescalero Apache Tribe's ski resort operated on nonreservation land.
32. 380 US. 68!j (1965).
33. The opinion does not clarify whether the trading post was operated by Indians or
non-Indians.
34. 380 US. at 691.
35. The Court later asserted that the Wawen Tmding Post decision was not exclusively based on preemption principles. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 170 n.6 (1973).
36. 411 US. 164 (1973).
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stead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the
limits of state power.
The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit,
but because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable
treaties and federal statutes m u s t be read."

The Court, after examining the applicable treaty and statutes,
determined the federal position had consistently been that Arizona could not tax the Indians on the Navajo Reservation.
Although the McClanahan decision signals a retreat from
exclusive reliance on principles of sovereignty in decisions involving ~tate~encroachments,
it arguably strengthens the tribal position v i s - h i s the states. Since the infringement test was sometimes interpreted so as to allow significant state intrusions, the
protection afforded the tribes by that test was tenuous, even
though it was based on notions of inherent powers of selfgovernment?'
Although tribal protection from state encroachment under
the McClanahan test depends basically on the existence of an
applicable statute or treaty, this does not necessarily mean the
courts will require specific statutory or treaty language in order
to insulate tribes from state action. Indeed, the McClanahan
Court relied heavily upon implications from the relevant statutes
and treaty? A broad reading of the relevant law is justified in
light of the McClanahan rule that requires statutes and treaties
to be read against the backdrop of tribal sovereignty. Hence, as
the pertinent law is analyzed, there exists a presumption against
state encroachmeqt
37. Id. at 172 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted).
38. A 1971case, in addition to foreshadowing McClanahan's emphasis on the applicable treaties and legislation in state encroachment cases, highlighted the difference between sole reliance on the infringement test and reliance instead on federal law. In Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (per curiam), the Court was confronted with
a fact situation similar to Williams. Kennerly involved a state court action against reservation Indians to collect a debt incurred on the reservation. However, the Blackfeet Tribe
involved in Kennerly had passed a law consenting to concurrent civil jurisdiction over
tribal members with the State of Montana. Even though tribal consent vitiated any claim
of state infringement, the Court relied on the "governing Act of Congress" language of the
Williams infringement test to invalidate state court jurisdiction. The governing act was
Public Law 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (current version a t 18 U.S.C. Ej 1162 (1976),
25 U.S.C. Sj§ 1321-1326 (1976), and 28 U.S.C. $ 1360 (1976)) (for a brief discussion of
Public Law 280, see note 45, infra), and since Montana had not assumed civil jurisdiction
by affirmative legislation (Montana had assumed criminal jurisdiction), the Court held
that state court jurisdiction under the facts presented was improper.
39. See 411 U.S. a t 173-79.
40. The Court noted that there was little chance that a state encroachment case
would come up where no federal treaty or legislation applied since "in almost all cases

-
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Federal Indian policy has been characterized by a marked
lack of consistency. From the late eighteenth century until only
recently, the policy pattern can generally be described as one of
vacillation between two extremes: (1) the policy of separation-the tribes should be separated from the general non-Indian
population; and (2) the policy of assimilation-the Indians
should be acculturated into the general American society.41The
treatymaking and reservation days of the first half of the nineteenth century,42the assimilative General Allotment Act of
1887,43the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,44and the terminadivergent attempts by
tion legislation of the 1 9 5 0 ' ~
all~represent
~
the federal government to finally solve the "Indian problem."
federal treaties and statutes define the boundaries of federal and state jurisdiction." Id.
at 172 n.8.
41. Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 139, 139-40 (19'77).
A HISTORY
42. For a general discussion of early federal Indian pol'icy, see S. TYLER,
OF INDIAN POLJCY
32-94 (1973). For a good discussion of judicial review of treaties, see
Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water
Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth9'-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF.L. REV.
601 (1975).
43. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (current version in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). The
major facet of the General Allotment Act was a provision for land allotments to be given
to individual Indians. Ch. 119, § 1,24 Stat. 388 (current version at 25 U.S.C. 5 331 (1976)).
Congress hoped that this would encourage the Indians to imitate the white man and to
follow his ways. See S. TYLER,supra note 42, at 95-124; Washburn, The Historical Context
of American Indian Legal Problems, 40 LAW& CONTEMP.PROB.12, 18-19 (1976).
44. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (current version a t 25 U.S.C. 55 461-479 (1976)). The Reorganization Act played a major role in the revitalization of the t~ibes.For one thing, it
ended the practice of individual allotments which had seriously eroded the reservation
land bases. Additionally, the Act acknowledged the tribes' right to organize governments
and authorized the adoption of tribal constitutions and bylaws. Ch. 576, 5 16, 48 Stat.
984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976)). For a general discussion of the Indian Reorganization Act, see Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, 70 MICH.L. REV. 955 (1972).
45. The policy of termination was generally spelled out in a House Concurrent Resolution:
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians
within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and
entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other
citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards of the United States,
and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American
citizenship . . . .
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953). Termination legislation
took both particular and general forms. Some tribes were expressly terminated. E.g., Act
of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (repealed by Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770 (1973) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 54 903-903f (1976))). The foregoing
legislation dealt with the termination and later restoration of the Menominee Tribe.
Restoration is an atypical result for a terminated tribe. For a chronicle of the Menominee
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Current federal policy recognizes the failure of the termination legislation and does not purport to constitute a quick and
final disposition of the "Indian problem." It is succinctly described by the appellation, "Indian self-determinati~n."~~
The
Supreme Court has declared that the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968" was passed partially in furtherance of the goals of selfdetermination? Likewise, two years after the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act, the policy of self-determination was clearly
articulated in a speech to Congress by then-President Nixon."
President Nixon recognized that federal policy had varied
between two extremes: (1)excessive federal paternalism, and (2)
termination of the federal-tribal relati~nship.~~
In order to combat
this discordant pattern, President Nixon made the following recommendation:
This, then, must be the goal of any new national policy
toward the Indian people: to strengthen the Indian's sense of
autonomy without threatening his sense of community. We
must assure the Indian that he can assume control of his own
life without being separated involuntarily from the tribal group.
And we must make it clear that Indians can become indepenexperience, see Preloznik & Felsenthal, The Menominee Struggle to Maintain Their
Tribal Assets and Protect Their Treaty Rights Following Termination, 51 N.D.L. REV.53
(1974).
Another major piece of termination legislation, general in its application, is commonly referred to as Public Law 280. It granted certain states jurisdiction over all civil
and criminal matters occurring on Indian reservations. It also allowed any other of the
unnamed states to assert similar jurisdiction by affirmative legislative act. Public Law
280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (current version at 18 U.S.C. 5 1162 (1976), 25 U.S.C. $5
1321-1326 (1976), and 28 U.S.C. 5 1360 (1976)). For a background discussion of the termination policy, see Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 41.
46. See, e.g., Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 41, a t 162-65; Comment, The Indian
Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CALIF.L. REV.445, 463 (1970). It is still too early to tell
whether this policy will endure or whether it is simply another in a long procession of
short-lived federal formulas.
47. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tits. II-VII, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 55 1301-1341
(1976)). The ICRA made most, but not all, of the Bill of Rights proscriptions applicable
to Indian tribes (the ICRA contains no establishment clause, for example). The Bill of
Rights was previously considered inapplicable to the tribes because the Supreme Court
had held in 1896 that the fifth amendment grand jury clause was unenforceable against
the Cherokee Tribe. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). The Talton Court adopted the
following rationale: "It follows that as the powers of local self government enjoyed by the
Cherokee nation existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the Fifth
Amendment, which . . . had for its sole object to control the powers conferred by the
Constitution on the National Government." Id. a t 384. Talton was generally interpreted
as making the Bill of Rights as a whole inoperable against Indian tribes. See, e.g., Native
Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
48. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62-66 (1978).
49. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 1970 PUB.PAPERS
564.
50. Id. a t 566-69.
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dent of Federal control without being cut off from Federal concern and Federal support.51

The President's primary intent was to allow the Indians to control
appropriate federal programs, especially local e d u c a t i ~ n . ~ ~
Congress' response is exemplified by the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975." A portion
of the declaration of the Act's policy reads:
The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance
of the Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship
with and responsibility to the Indian people through the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy
which will permit an orderly transition from Federal domination
of programs for and services to Indians to effective and meaningful participation by the Indian people in the planning, conduct,
and administration of those programs and services.54

The Act directs the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to contract out various
programs to the tribes upon request.55Furthermore, it directs the
Department of the Interior to grant funds upon tribal request for
the improvement of tribal governments, and HEW to do the same
for the development or improvement of health facilities." Likewise, it contains broad provisions for Indian involvement in the
education of Indian children?
A few days prior to the passage of the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act, Congress, in a
joint resolution, created the American Indian Policy Review
Commission to make a "comprehensive review of Indian aff a i r ~ . "The
~ ~ Commission submitted its final report to Congress
on May 17, 1977. The Commission endorsed the policy of selfdetermination and identified two basic principles of Indian law
to guide future policy determinations: (1)tribal sovereignty, and
(2) a federal-tribal trust relationship?
51. Id. at $566-67.
52. Id. at 567-71.
53. Pub, L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 25, 42, 50
U.S.C.).
54. 25 U.S.C. (j 450a(b) (1976).
55. Id. $4 450f-450g.
56. Id. (j 450h.
57. Id. (j$ 455-458e.
58. Id. (r 174 note.
59. Specifically, the Commission stated:
The fundamental concepts which must guide future policy determinations
are:
1. That Indian tribes are sovereign political bodies, having the power to
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True to the legislative mandate, the Commission's report is
indeed comprehensive," and no attempt is made here to summarize it. Concerning legislation affecting tribal sovereignty, the
report states: "This Commission has not proposed any legislative
action with regard to the jurisdiction or authority of tribal governments. We have rejected any such effort as being premature and
not warranted by any factual evidence."" So long as Congress
endorses this view and refrains from passing legislation affecting
inherent tribal authority, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty as
interpreted by the judiciary will play a major role in the tribes'
pursuit of self-determination. With this in mind, the Supreme
Court's sovereignty analysis in three recent decisions will now be
studied.

IV. THECASESOF THE 1977-1978 TERM
None of the 1977-1978 Supreme Court sovereignty decisions
involved attempted state encroachments upon tribal sovereignty.
Since modern development of the sovereignty doctrine primarily
concerned such state encroachments, the 1977-1978 decisions
offer profitable comparisons of the application of the doctrine in
different factual contexts.
A.

I.

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
Facts and posture before the Court

Mark David Oliphant was arrested by authorities of the Suquamish Indian Tribe during the annual Chief Seattle Days celedetermine their own membership and power to enact laws and enforce them
within the boundaries of their reservations, and
2. That the relationship which exists between the tribes and the United
States is premised on a special trust that must govern the conduct of the
stronger toward the weaker.
POLICY
REVIEW
COMMISSION,
supra note 3, at 3-5.
The Policy Review Commission was not without its dissenters. Vice Chairman Lloyd
Meeds vigorously disagreed with the majority report. He claimed that the report was "the
product of one-sided advocacy in favor of American Indian tribes." Id. at 571 (separate
dissenting views of Congressman Lloyd Meeds). His main point of contention was the
majority report's view of tribal sovereignty:
The fundamental error of this report is that it perceives the American
Indian tribe as a body politic in the nature of a sovereign as that word is used
to describe the United States and the States, rather than as a body politic which
the United States, through its sovereign power, permits to govern itself and
order its internal affairs, but not the affairs of others. The report seeks to convert
a political notion into a legal doctrine.
Id. it 573 (emphasis in original).
60. The Commission made 206 specific recommendations.
61. POLICY
REVIEW
COMMISSION,
supra note 3, at 5.
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bration sponsored by the tribe. He was charged with assaulting a
tribal officer and resisting arrest. Daniel B. Belgarde was arrested
by authorities of the same tribe after a high-speed chase ending
in a collision between Belgarde's car and a tribal police car. He
was charged with "recklessly endangering another person" and
with injuring tribal property. Both Oliphant and Belgarde were
non-Indians who resided on the Suquamish Reservation.
Both men petitioned the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington for writs of habeas corpus. Tribal
proceedings were stayed pending the outcome of the habeas petitions. Both petitioners argued the Suquamish Indian Provisional
Court lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The district
court denied the habeas petitions. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the denial of Oliphant's petition, reasoning that
"the power to preserve order on the reservation, when necessary
by punishing those who violate tribal law, is a sine qua non of the
sovereignty that the' Suquamish originally pos~essed."~~
Judge
Kennedy dissented, explaining that "[plrinciples of 'tribal sovereignty' developed in the preemption context simply have no
application [to the problem presented] here? Focusing on relevant legislation rather than the doctrine of tribal sovereignty,
Judge Kennedy concluded, "Unlike the majority, I would not
require an express congressional withdrawal of jurisdiction" to
divest the tribe of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian~.~'
While
Belgarde's appeal was pending before the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court granted both Oliphant's and Belgarde's certiorari
petitions to "decide whether Indian tribal courts have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. "65
2. Sovereignty analysis

Oliphant u. Suquamish Indian TribeMpresented the Court
with a problem never before presented: the propriety of tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in the absence of congressional authorization. The Suquamish Tribe based its claim of
62. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The circuit court stated the issue as
follows: "The question is not whether Congress has conferred jurisdiction upon the tribe.
The tribe, before it was conquered, had jurisdiction, as any independent nation does. The
question therefore is, did Congress (or a treaty) take that jurisdiction away?" Id. at 1009
n.1.
63. Id. at 1015 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1019.
65. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
66. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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right to prosecute non-Indians on its powers of inherent sovereignty. Because Congress had not expressly taken away its power
to prosecute non-Indians, the tribe argued it retained such power
as part of its inherent sovereignty. Oliphant and Belgarde argued
that the doctrine of tribal sovereignty is a t odds with principles
of international law, decisions of the Supreme Court, and federal
law." Thus, the issue was framed so as to turn on the basic distinction of whether, in the absence of a governing treaty or congressional act, Indian tribes exercise inherent or delegated power.
Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion, went great
lengths to demonstrate that at one time all three branches of the
federal government shared the view that Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians." With regard to this
"commonly shared presumption," Justice Rehnquist stated:
"[Wlhile not conclusive on the issue before us, [the presumption] carries considerable weight.""
The opinion then examined the applicable treaty, the Treaty
of Point Elliott. Relying upon language of the treaty wherein the
Suquamish Tribe acknowledged its dependence on the United
States and promised to deliver up federal offenders to the United
States, Rehnquist concluded that, when viewed in historical context, these passages cast "substantial doubt" on the right of the
tribe to prosecute n~n-Indians.~O
The. Court admitted, however,
that the treaty provisions alone would be insufficient to deprive
the Suquamish Tribe of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians."
Without treaty or statutory provisions upon which to base a
decision, the Court was faced squarely with the task of defining
the general governing powers of an American Indian tribe. The
Court responded by fashioning the following characterization of
Indian tribal powers:
[T]he tribes' retained powers are not such that they are limited
only by specific restrictions in treaties or congressional enact67. Brief for Petitioners a t 19-20, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
( 1978).

68. 435 U.S. a t 196-206. Justice Rehnquist considered this view to be "shared" by the
"lower federal courts" on the basis of one federal district court case decided in 1878, Ex
parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720). 435 U.S. a t 199-201, 206.
69. 435 U.S. a t 206.
70. Id. at 206-08. The Court attempted to reconcile this conclusion with a general rule
of Indian treaty construction that "ambiguous expressions must be resolved in favor of
the Indian parties concerned," Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 42, a t 617, by implying
that the meaning of the treaty provisions is " 'clear from the surrounding circumstances.' "
435 U.S. a t 208 n.17 (quoting DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444
( 19%) ).
71. 435 U.S. a t 208.
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ments. As the Court of Appeals recognized, Indian tribes are
prohibited from exercising both those powers of autonomous
states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those powers "inconsistent with their status."72

Oliphant's "inconsistent with their status" exception, later
referred to by the Court as the "implicit divestiture" e~ception,?~
deserves close attenti~n.'~
The Court noted that two other powers
had previously been found to be inconsistent with the Indians'
status: the power to convey reservation land75and the power to
form political alliances with foreign nations.'Vhe Court, however, emphasized that the implicit divestiture exception is not
"restricted to limitations on the tribes' power to transfer lands or
exercise external political ~overeignty."~~
The Court also quoted a passage from a separate opinion of
Justice Johnson in the 1810 case of Fletcher v. Peck for the proposition that Indian tribes lack power over anyone but themselves.
"[TJhe restrictions upon the right of soil in the Indians, amount
. . . to an exclusion of all competitors [to the United States]
from their markets; and the limitation upon their sovereignty
amounts to the right of governing every person within their limits
except themselves. "7R At best this sentence is misleading; at worst
it is wrong. In the context of Johnson's opinion, it came as an
answer to his own question: "What, then, practically, is the interest of the states in the soil of the Indians within their
b~undaries?"~~
At first glance, the portion of the answer following
the semicolon seems to suggest that the Indians have the right to
govern everyone within their borders "except themselves," a patently absurd conclusion. One reasonable interpretation of this
72. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 544 F.2d a t 1009).
73. The Court used "implicit divestiture" in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
326 (1978), to refer to the exception to tribal sovereignty promulgated in Oliphant.
"Implicit divestiture" will be used instead of "inconsistent with their status" to refer to
the exception both because of its preferred length and its preferred descriptiveness.
74. This formulation is similar to the second prong of Cohen's definition of tribal
governing powers, set out in full a t note 4 supra. Cohen distinguishes between internal
powers, like local self-government, and external powers, such as forming treaties with
foreign nations. Cohen states the external powers are terminated upon conquest, apparently because such powers are inconsistent with the tribes' status relative to the United
States,
75. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
76. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1831).
77. 435 U S . a t 209.
78. Id. (emphasis and brackets in original) (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 147 (1810) (separate opinion of Johnson, J.)).
79. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810) (separate opinion of Johnson,
.J.). Since the question inquires into the interests of the states, Rehnquist's bracketed
insertion of "to the United States" results in a misquotation.
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confusing sentence is that the limitations on Indian sovereignty
allow the states the right of governing every person within tribal
limits except the Indians. This would at least be a logical, if not
accurate, answer to the question posed.80The statement, if interpreted in this manner, says nothing directly about the Indians'
power to govern non-Indians.
The Court in Oliphant ultimately concluded that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is inconsistent with
the status of Indian tribes?' The rationale employed in arriving
at this result deserves full illumination:
Protection of territory within its external political boundaries is,
of course, as central to the sovereign interests of the United
States as it is to any other sovereign nation. But from the formation of the Union and the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the
United States has manifested an equally great solicitude that its
citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted
intrusions on their personal liberty. The power of the United
States to try and criminally punish is an important manifestation of the power to restrict personal liberty. By submitting to
the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes
therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to
Congress. This principle would have been obvious a century ago
when most Indian tribes were characterized by a "want of fixed
laws [and] of competent tribunals of justice." . . . It should be
no less obvious today, even though present-day Indian tribal
courts embody dramatic advances over their historical antecedentsex2

It is difficult to extract a workable rule from this case for use
in future cases involving the assertion of tribal power over nonIndians. The Court apparently concluded that any exercise of
tribal government that intrudes without warrant on the personal
liberty of non-Indians is inconsistent with tribal status. Beyond
this, the Court offers no guidance in future applications of the
implicit divestiture exception to tribal sovereignty.
80. Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Fletcher allowed the states to hold title
to lands reserved to Indian tribes. This position was later rejected by the Marshall Court.
Martone, supra note 3, at 619. Perhaps this explains the confusion surrounding the use
by the Oliphant Court of the material quoted from Johnson's opinion.
81. In a surprisingly short dissent, given the case's importance, Justice Marshall,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, "agreerd] with the court below that the 'power to preserve
order on the reservation . . is a sine qua non of the sovereignty that the Suquamish
originally possessed.' " 435 U.S. a t 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting 544 F.2d a t
1009). Justice Brennan did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.
82. 435 U.S. at 209-10 (quoting H.R.REP.NO. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1834)).

.
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Arguably, any exercise of governmental power by an Indian
tribe over a non-Indian intrudes upon his personal liberty. Hence,
the implicit divestiture exception promulgated in Oliphant could
be used to strike down every tribal attempt to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians." This would result in restricting the Indian
tribes to the exclusive exercise of delegated powers in governing
non-Indians since a power inconsistent with tribal status can only
be exercised "in a manner acceptable to Congres~."~~

B. United States v. Wheeler
1. Facts and posture before the Court
Anthony Robert Wheeler, a Navajo, pleaded guilty to
charges brought against him by the Navajo Tribe of disorderly
conduct and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Over a
year later, Wheeler was indicted by a federal grand jury in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona on a
charge of statutory rape arising out of the same incident that led
to the tribal charges. Wheeler moved to dismiss the federal charge
on the basis of double jeopardy, since contributing to the delinquency of a minor is a lesser included offense of statutory rape.
The district court dismissed the indictment and, upon appeal,
83. At least one lower court has interpreted Oliphunt in this manner. See TransCanada Enterprises v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribes, [I9781 5 DIM L. REP. (AILTP) #
F-153 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 1978) (relying on Oliphant, district court set aside its original
order allowing tribe to regulate land use on non-Indian owned land and to impose business
fees on nowIndians within the reservation). Rut see Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Dist. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, No. 78-352 (D. Ariz. July 11, 1978)
(memorandum and order) (Indian tribe found to possess inherent power to tax non-Indian
interest in leased land on the reservation, Oliphant notwithstanding).
Three years before Oliphant, the Court announced that Congress had the authority
to delegate to a tribe the power to regulate liquor on a reservatibn. United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S.544 (1975).The case involved a federal prosecution of a non-Indian who
operated a tavern on privately owned land within the Wind River Reservation for doing
business without a tribal liquor license. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a unanimous
Court, reasoned that the propriety of the delegation was enhanced by the tribe's
"independent authority over matters that affect the internal and social relations of tribal
life." Id. at 557. One wonders whether the Court, and especially Justice Rehnquist, has
retreated from this position since Mazurie, or whether Oliphant will be limited to its
specific holding of divesting tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, thus leaving
the question of other types of jurisdiction over non-Indians, such as business regulation
and taxation, subject to further analysis.
The Indian Policy Review Commission stated the following with regard to tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians: "We . . . reject the notion that the jurisdictional reach of
Indian tribes within Indian country should be limited to their own membership alone."
REVIEW
COMMISSION,
supra note 3, at 5.
POLICY
84. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. at 210.
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the Ninth Circuit upheld the d i s m i s ~ a lThe
. ~ ~ Ninth Circuit felt
the case presented the question of "whether Indian tribal courts
and federal district courts are 'arms of different sovereigns.' "M
This was the crucial determination since, under the "dual sovereignty" principle, successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns
do not amount to double jeopardy. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts over
whether successive prosecutions by federal and tribal authorities
constitute double jeopardy."
2. Sovereignty analysis

The sovereignty issue in United States v. WheeleP arises in
a unique factual situation. No Indian tribe's affirmative exercise
of governmental power was being questioned, nor was a tribe
claiming interference from another government. Rather, the decision revolved solely around the vitality of the basic theory of
tribal sovereignty. Indeed, the Wheeler decision turned on the
distinction between delegated and inherent powers.
The Court had previously held that successive prosecutions
by state and federal governments were valid,R9but that prosecution by a territorial court could not be followed by federal prosecution.'O The distinction lies in the concept of dual sovereignty.
While prosecution by two different arms of the same sovereign is
prohibited, successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns do not
constitute double je~pardy.~'
Hence, the Court was faced with the
question of whether Indian tribes are more like states or federal
territories.
According to Justice Stewart, "the controlling question in
this case is the source of this power to punish tribal offenders: Is
it a part of inherent tribal sovereignty, or an aspect of the sovereignty of the Federal Government which has been delegated to
the tribes by Congres~?"~~
A unanimous Courtg3rejected the argu85. United States v. Wheeler, 545 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 313
( 1978).

86. 545 F.2d a t 1256.
87. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 316 (1978).
88. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
89. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959).
90. Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937); see Grafton v. United States, 206
U.S. 333 (1907).
91. For a recent discussion of the dual sovereignty doctrine, see State v. Rogers, 90
N.M. 604, 566 P.2d 1142 (1977).
92. 435 U.S. a t 322.
93. .Justice Brennan did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.
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ment that Congress' plenary authority over the tribes necessarily
implies that a tribe is dependent upon Congress for its source of
power.'l Instead, "[tlhe powers of Indian tribes are, in general,
'inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished.' "" Summing up these powers and limitations, the
Court attempted to delineate the scope of tribal governmental
powers:
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and
limited character. It exists only a t the sufferance of Congress
and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts,
the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by
treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their
dependent status.Y6

After examining the relevant treaties and statutes, the Court
found that the Navajo Tribe did indeed possess criminal jurisdiction over its members as a result of the tribe's retained, inherent
sovereignty. Consequently, the federal and tribal prosecutions
were not conducted by the same sovereign. Under the dual sovereignty principle, therefore, the successive prosecutions did not
violate the double jeopardy clause.97
The result in Wheeler is not nearly as important as the rationale employed in arriving a t that result. The Court unmistakably and explicitly concluded that the general governmental powers exercised by an Indian tribe are inherent, not delegated. The
Court also expanded the Oliphant implicit divestiture exception.
The Court explained that the Indian tribes' criminal jurisdiction over their own members was not lost as a necessary result of
their dependent status. Instead, "[tlhe areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have occurred
are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and
nonmembers of the tribe."WI'he Court listed three areas of im94. 435 US. a t 319-20.
95. Id. a t 322 (emphasis in original) (quoting F. COHEN,supra note 3, at 122).
96. Id. a t 323.
97. Id. a t 326-32. The Court also expressed concern that since tribal punishment is
limited by the Indian Civil Rights Act to a maximum sentence of six months in jail and a
$500 fine, an earlier tribal prosecution for a serious offense could preclude a federal prosecution where a much more serious punishment could result, thereby frustrating important
federal interests in the prosecution of major offenses. Id. a t 330-31.
The Wheeler decision demonstrates the sometimes conflicting positions of Indian
tribes and individual Indians. Although Wheeler constitutes a victory for the tribes, it
cannot be so described for the individual Indian.
98. Id. a t 326. The Court's use of "nonmembers" instead of %on-Indians" is most
likely inadvertent. I t is not clear, for instance, whether the nonmember daughter (who,
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plicit divestiture: (1)power to freely alienate land to non-Indians,
(2) power to "enter into direct commercial or governmental relations" with foreign nations, and (3) power to prosecute nonmembers? The Court explained that these are areas of implicit divestiture because the tribes' dependent status is inconsistent with
the "freedom independently to determine their external relation~."~'~'
The Court's explanation that implicit divestiture of sovereignty has occurred in areas involving relations between tribes
and nonmembers can mean one of two things. It could mean that
any attempt by an Indian tribe to exercise governmental power
over nonmembers will be struck down under the implicit divestiture exception, or it could simply mean that application of the
exception is limited to relations between tribes and non-Indians.
In the context of the decision, the language was probably used to
show that the implicit divestiture exception did not apply in the
Wheeler case because it involved a tribal exercise of power over
a tribal member. Since the exception is limited to tribalnonmember relations, it could not apply to the Wheeler facts.
The Wheeler case, then, should not be read as invalidating every
tribal exercise of governmental power over nonmembers. Rather,
it merely explained that when the "implicit divestiture" exception is invoked, it will be in a tribal-nonmember context.

C . Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
I . Facts and posture before the Court
Julia Martinez, a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo, and her
daughter, Audrey Martinez, brought a class action suit against
the pueblo in the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico. Io1 They sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the pueblo and its governor, in an attempt to enjoin the
enforcement of a membership ordinance. The pueblo had passed
an ordinance declaring that a child born of a Santa Claran father
and a non-Santa Claran mother was a member of the pueblo, but
although the child of a Santa Claran mother and a Navajo father and raised on the
reservation, was refused Santa Claran membership) in Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo,
436 US. 49 (1978), discussed in notes 101-22 and accompanying text infra, would be in
the same position vis-a-vis the Santa Claran Tribe as would a non-Indian residing on the
reservation.
99. 435 U.S. at 326.
100. Id.

101. Julia Martinez represented the class of Santa Claran women married to nonmembers. Audrey Martinez represented the class of children of a Santa Claran mother
and a non-Santa Claran father.
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a child whose father was a non-Santa Claran and whose mother
was a Santa Claran could not be a member of the pueblo. Audrey
Martinez had lived on the Santa Clara Reservation her entire life,
but because her father was a Navajo she was ineligible for Santa
Claran membership. The Martinezes alleged a denial of equal
protection under the Indian Civil Rights Act. The pueblo and its
governor moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide intratribal matters involving tribal self-government. The district court denied this
motion, relying heavily on the great preponderance of case law
supporting federal court jurisdiction in such a
Following a full trial on the merits, the district court issued
a judgment in favor of the tribe. The opinion discussed the development of the Santa Clara Pueblo and the historical background
of its membership policies. The court felt that the "equal protection" clause of the Indian Civil Rights Act should be construed
differently from the similar federal constitutional guarantee,"13
and concluded that the clause should not be interpreted "in a
manner that would invalidate a tribal membership ordinance
when the classification attacked is one based on criteria that have
been traditionally employed by the tribe in considering membership questions. "In4
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's holding as to jurisdiction, but reversed its decision
on the merits.Io5The circuit court reasoned that "to the extent
t h a t the Indian Civil Rights Act applies, tribal immunity is
thereby limited."'" With the immunity barrier passed, the court
determined that 28 U.S .C. $ l343(4), which establishes federal
jurisdiction for actions seeking to protect civil rights under an act
of Congress,1n7was properly a basis for jurisdiction. The circuit
court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the equal
protection clause of the ICRA should not be interpreted on the
basis of fourteenth amendment precedent alone. Nevertheless,
using fourteenth amendment standards as a "persuasive guide,"
102. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 7-8 (D.N.M. 1975), reu'd, 540
F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
103. Id. at 17.
104. Id. at 18.
105. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S.
49 (1978).
106. Id. at 1042.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) states in part: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . . .
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress
providing for the protection of civil rights . . . ."
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the court determined that the ICRA provision had been violated.IowThe Supreme Court granted certiorari.luY
2. Sovereignty analysis

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez1"'presented the Court with
a task of statutory interpretation. The lower courts, in upholding
jurisdiction, had relied on an implied congressional waiver of
tribal sovereign immunity extracted from the terms of the Indian
Civil Rights Act. Lending support to the lower courts' decisions
were Justice Blackmun's recently voiced doubts "about the continuing vitality in this day of the doctrine of tribal immunity."I1'
In spite of these arguments, the Supreme Court dealt with the
immunity issue almost summarily in an opinion by Justice Marshall.
The Court stated that the Indian tribes enjoy the common
law immunity from suit enjoyed by sovereigns. Although the
Court recognized that this aspect of tribal sovereignty could be
limited by Congress,Il2the Court held "that a waiver of sovereign
immunity ' "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." ' "Il3 Since the ICRA contained no express waiver of
sovereign immunity, the Court held that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity barred suit against the Santa Clara Pueblo.Il4
The Court was still confronted, however, with the issue of
whether the ICRA implied a cause of action against the governor
of the pueblo since, as an officer of the pueblo, he was not protected by sovereign immunity. Resolution of this issue involved
the doctrine of tribal sovereignty since "providing a federal forum
for issues arising under § 1302 [ICRA's "bill of rights"] constitutes an interference with tribal autonomy and self-government
beyond that created by the change in substantive law itself."IiJ
The Court reviewed the factors relevant "in determining whether
a cause of action is implicit in a statute not expressly providing
one,"%md decided that not all of the requirements were met.
108. 540 F.2d at 1046-48.
109. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 431 U.S. 913 (1977).
110. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
111. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 178 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
112. "This aspect of tribal sovereignty, like all others, is subject to the superior and
plenary control of Congress." 436 U.S. at 58.
113. Id. (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United
States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969))).
114. Id. at 59.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 60. The relevant factors to be considered in determining whether a statute
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The Court felt that it was unnecessary to provide a
"judicially sanctioned intrusion into tribal sovereignty" in order
to fulfill the purposes of the ICRA.l17 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court relied on the directive of McClanahan: the ICRA must
be read against the backdrop of tribal sovereignty."The Court
identified two competing congressional purposes behind the
ICRA: (1)to strengthen the "position of individual tribal members vis-A-vis the tribe," and (2) "to promote the well-established
federal 'policy of furthering Indian self-government.' " l t Y Analyzing these purposes against the backdrop of tribal sovereignty, the
Court concluded that in this case, the scales tipped in favor of the
latter purpose. Therefore, no cause of action was implied under
the ICRA against the governor.
Justice White dissented, arguing that the ICRA did imply a
cause of action against the governor. Justice White agreed with
the majority that the suit against the pueblo was barred by tribal
immunity. He felt, however, that the underlying purposes of the
ICRA could be furthered only by permitting the additional intrusion into tribal self-government that would result from recognizing a federal cause of action against the governor.lM
Martinez demonstrates the reluctance of the Supreme Court
to permit interference with the sovereignty of the Indian tribes.
Equally significant, however, are its practical implications. The
ICRA had provided a fruitful source of federal jurisdiction over
cases alleging tribal abuses, but Martinez indicates that similar
actions will now be limited to tribal courts. Moreover, since the
Court found no congressional waiver of sovereign immunity, that
defense will be available to a tribe in its own courts unless the
tribe itself has expressly waived it.
The Martinez opinion contains dictum that is curious in light
of the recent decisions in Oliphant and Wheeler. Responding to
a contention of the court of appeals that the constitutional norms
of the ICRA could not be realized without federal jurisdiction, the
implies a cause of action are: (1) Is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose benefit
the statute was passed? (2) Is there any implicit or express legislative intent to create or
deny such a cause of action? (3) Is the remedy sought consistent with the general policy
of the legislative scheme? And (4) is the cause of action one normally left to the tribal
law? Id. a t 60 n.lO.
117. Id. a t 61.
118. Id. a t 60.
119. Id. a t 62 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.535, 551 (1974)).
120. Id. a t 79-83 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined in all parts of the
majority opinion except the section wherein the tribe was "recognized as possessing the
common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." Id. at 58.
Justice Blackmun did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.
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Court emphasized that tribal forums would still be available.
"Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate
forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and nonIndians. "I2' The Court cited
for this proposition, a
case in which the non-Indian party was the plaintiff. Therefore,
perhaps the dictum was intended only to mean that non-Indians
may bring suit in tribal courts. Surely, when a non-Indian is
involved in an ICRA suit he will usually be the moving party since
the ICRA prohibits abuses of civil rights by tribal governments.
The tribe or a tribal official will normally be the defendant in
such cases. Nevertheless, the dictum does lend credence to the
argument that Oliphant is not the final word on the issue of
whether tribal attempts to assert noncriminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians are valid.

A cursory review of recent Indian law decisions could lead to
the following conclusions concerning the Supreme Court's view of
tribal governing powers: (1)Indian tribes have broad governmental control over their own members, (2) encroachments upon Indian tribes by other governments will generally be disallowed,
and (3) Indian tribes lack governmental power over non-Indians.
Unfortunately, the Court decisions used as support for these conclusions have not always been based on consistent reasoning. Because the area of Indian affairs involves major matters of policy
(like similarly political fields), doctrinal purity in judicial decisions has sometimes been sacrificed to the pressures of public
opinion. However, there are dangers in such a judicial course.
Absent judicial consistency, decisional capriciousness may prevail, leaving those who might be affected by court decisions confused and uncertain, unable to reasonably predict the direction
of the wandering judicial travail.
Regardless of the theoretical inconsistencies inherent in recognizing Indian tribes as sovereigns in the American system of
federalism, the Court consistently adheres to the general position
that tribes possess the powers of limited sovereignty. Necessarily,
then, the actual limits imposed upon tribal sovereignty are of
primary importance in determining the scope of tribal governing
powers. Since treaties are no longer entered into between the
121. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
122. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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Indians and the United States, Congress' plenary authority over
the tribes defines the modern limits upon tribal sovereignty.
In Oliphant, however, the Supreme Court chose to impose a
substantial judicial limit upon tribal governing power. The Court
announced the implicit divestiture exception to tribal sovereignty, which takes away from the tribes powers that are
"inconsistent" with tribal status. Specifically, the Court held
that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians had been implicitly
divested. The Court failed, however, to describe the parameters
of the exception, allowing uncertainty to attend the exception
and its proper application. As a result, broad judicial limits could
be imposed upon tribal governing powers (especially powers over
non-Indians) without sufficient reasoning or justification.
The Wheeler and Martinez cases demonstrate the current
application of the predominant tribal sovereignty analysis-examining applicable statutes and treaties against the backdrop of tribal sovereignty. They also indicate the Court's willingness to adapt the approach developed in state encroachment
cases to different factual contexts. In Wheeler, since no treaty or
statute controlled the outcome, tribal sovereignty was converted
from a backdrop to an actor a t center stage. Recognizing the
inherent nature of tribal sovereignty, the Court held that Wheeler
had not been subjected to double jeopardy by successive tribal
and federal prosecutions. In Martinez, the tribal sovereignty
backdrop was held to immunize the Santa Clara Pueblo from suit
absent an express congressional waiver. Additionally, the sovereignty backdrop affected the Court's analysis of the ICRA to determine if the Act implied a cause of action against a tribal officer. Because one of two competing legislative purposes of the
ICRA was consistent with the concept of tribal sovereignty, that
purpose prevailed. Accordingly, no cause of action was implied.
By examining applicable treaties and statutes against the
backdrop of tribal sovereignty, a court can fairly reconcile the
somewhat conflicting legal principles of tribal sovereignty and
tribal subjection to congressional authority. Such an approach
realistically acknowledges the fundamental limiting power of
Congress, yet it also pays proper respect to the principle of tribal
sovereignty. However, a broad application of the implicit divestiture exception to tribal sovereignty, made possible by the failure
of the Court to supply adequate standards, would defeat this
approach and place the locus of limiting power in the courts.
Therefore, the Court should announce rules to govern application
of the implicit divestiture exception. Due deference for Congress'
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plenary authority suggests that narrow rules should govern such
application.
William D. Holyoak

